People v. Hutchinson by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
6-18-1969
People v. Hutchinson
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Hutchinson 71 Cal.2d 342 (1969).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/675
iJ 
342 PEOPLE v. HUTCHINSON [71 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 13154. In Bank. June 18, 1969.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and R.espondent, v. ROBERT BEE 
HUTCHINSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la,lb] Poisons - Narcotics - Evidence - Sufficiency - Unlaw-
ful Possession.-The evidence was sufficient to support a ver-
dict finding defendant guilty of possession of marijuana where 
it was shown that, although his brothers shared, and guests 
had access to, his bedroom in which boxes of marijuana were 
found hidden in the closet and under a bed, defendant fled 
from his home when his mother confronted him with the contra-
band, demanded an explanation and threatened to call the 
police. 
[2] Id.-Narcotics-Offenses-TIlegal . Possession.-Unlawful pos-
session of narcotics is established by proof that the accused 
exercised dominion and control over the contraband, that he 
had knowledge of its presence, and that he had knowledge that 
the material was a narcotic. 
[31 Id. - Narcotics - Evidence - Access Available to Another.-
When contraband is found in a place to which a defendant 
and others have access and over which none has exclusive con-
trol, no sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries 
of facts which will, and that which will not, constitute 
evidence of defendant's knowledge of its presence, and thus, 
proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are 
found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful 
posseSSIOn. 
[4] Id.-Narcotics-Instructions-Flight.-In a prosecution for 
possession of marijuana, the trial court. did not err in instruct-
ing the jury pursuant to Pen. Code, § 1127 c, on the signifi-
cance of flight, where it was shown that, after defendant's 
mother had confronted him with marijuana found in his bed-
room, demanded an explanation and threatened to eall the' 
police, he had fled from his home, and where the· jury. could 
have rejected his explanation that his flight had been only 
to escape his mother's emotional outburst and could reasonably 
have inferred, instead, a consciousness of guilt. . 
[5] Trial-Verdicts-Impeachment.-By decisional law, the rule 
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their own verdict is in-
applicable to the use of jurors' affidavits to prove that one 
or more of the jurors concealed bias or prejudice on voir 
dire, or that a juror was mentally incompetent at the time of 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Poisons, § 15(3); [2] Poisons, § 9.2 
(1) (a); [3] Poisons, § 15(6); [4] Poisons, § 16·( 4); [5-7] Trial, 
§ 206; f81 Trial, § 2()6; Criminal Law, § 944(5). 
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, 
trial, or that a juror did not intend to follow the court's instruc-
tions on the law and concealed that intention on voir dire. 
[6] Id.-Verdicts-Impeachment.-The only improper influences 
that may be proved under Evid. Code, § 1150, to impeach a 
yerdict are those open to sight, hearing and the other senses, 
and thus subject to corroboration. 
[7] Id.-Verdicts-Impeachment.-Under Evid. Code, § 1150, jur-
ors are competent witnesses to prove objective facts to impeach 
a yerdict. (Overruling, to the extent they are contrary to this . 
conclusion, Sopp v. Smith (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 12 [27 Cal.Rptr. 
593, 377 P.2d 649]; Kollert v. Cundiff (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 768 
[329 P.2d 897], and similar cases.) 
[8] Id.-Verdict--Impeachment.-In a criminal prosecution, it was 
reyersible error for the court to rest its denial. of defendant's 
motion for new trial on the ground that the jury could not 
impeach its own verdict, where the conduct complained of in 
the affidavit of the juror concerned was "likely to have influ-
enced the verdict improperly" (Evid. Code, § 1150), ana con-
sisted of impatient remarks and angry behavior on the bailiff's 
part, late in the evening, in "rushing" the jury into reaching 
a verdict. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County granting probation and from an order denying motion 
for a new trial in a prosecution for possession of marijuana. 
John C. Spence, Jr., Judge. Appeal from order denying new 
trial dismissed; orders vacated with directions. 
. ,Don Edgar Burris, under appointment by the Sllpreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant . 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
.Assistant Attorney General,and Robert T. Jacobs, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant R.obert Bee Hutchinson was 
aCcused by information of possession of marijuana for sale, 
and a jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of 
possession of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530.) He 
appeals from the order granting probation and from the order 
denying a new trial. The latter appeal is dismissed. (Pen. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 256; Am.Jur., Trial (1st ed § 1105 
et seq). 
[8] Time jury m~y be kept together on disagreement in criminal 
ease, note, 93 A.L.R.2d 627. . 
344 PEOPLE V. HUTCHINSON [71 C.2d 
Code, § 1237.) Defendant contends that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the verdict and that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in instructing on flight and in refusing to 
consider the affidavit of a juror in ruling on the motion for 
new trial. 
Defendant lived at his mother's and stepfather's home and 
shared a bedroom with two brothers and a stepbrother. For 
about a week before July 25, 1966, only defendant and one 
.brother occupied the bedroom, since the other two boys were 
away on vacation. On that date, while cleaning the bedroom 
and its closet, defendant's mother discovered a box containing 
stems and green plant material 'that appeared to her to be 
roots. She was unable to identify the clothing that covered the 
box as belonging to anyone of the boys and testified that "it 
had to belong to all of the boys, because it's there where they 
throw their real dirty clothes. ' , 
She continued cleaning and discovered another box under 
defendant's bed. Defendant's brother Ronnie, who was then 
16 years old, also used the same bed from time to time. The 
contents of the second box resembled tobacco leaves, but Mrs. 
Long could not tell what they were. At the trial it was estab-
lished that both boxes contained marijuana. After discovering 
the second box :hirs. Long became suspicious. When defendant 
came home with his stepfather after work about 5 0 'clock in 
the afternoon, Mrs. Long told her husband about the boxes 
while defendant was in another room. She then called defend-
ant to the living room and accused him of knowing to whom 
the boxes and their contents belonged because she felt "that 
he's the oldest of the children [he was then 18 years oldfand-
when we're not at home, he's responsible. And I was scream-, 
ing at him, you know, and things, really was.. . . I told him 
if he didn't tell me where it came from, I was going to call 
the police." Defendant replied that "it wasn't his and he 
didn't know anything about it." Defendant and his mother 
became emotional and began to cry. Defendant said to his 
stepfather, "God, dad, do something with mother. I can'1' 
stand this." lIe then left the living room and went toward 
his bedroom. 
About 25 minutes later Mrs. Long called the police, who 
arrived within half an hour. Defendant had left the house 
through his bedroom window. About half an hour after the 
police had left with the boxes, defendant called his home from 
a telephone some five blocks away and asked his stepfather if 
his mother was all right. Mr. Long replied that she had 
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"calmed down" and tbat " We called the police." Defend-
ant asked, "Well, you want me to come home~" and Mr. 
Long replied ' , No, no. I'll come and get you." He did so, 
and the next morning defendant and Mr. and Mrs. Long went 
to the police station, where defendant was placed under 
arrest. 
Defendant testified that he had not seen the two boxes at 
any time until he came home on the day his mother con-
fronted him with them. He had never seen any of his brothers 
with material like that found in the two boxes and had never 
seen marijuana in his home. He admitted that he had seen 
marijuana in cigarettes at other places and knew that it was a 
green leafy substance similar to tobacco. He further testified 
that his mother did not tell him that she was going to call the 
police and that he did -not hear her call them. He left the 
house by going out the window only to avoid further conflict 
with his mother. 
On the evening before the discovery of the marijuana, 
friends of defendant and his brothers and sisters had visited 
the Long house for a swimming party. Mr. and Mrs. Long 
went out and le~t defendant in charge. The boys who attended 
such swimming parties dressed and undressed in the Long 
boys' bedroom. Defendant's brother Ronnie had been away 
on vacation for several days but returned after defendant was 
arrested. When told that defendant was to be released on bail 
and was coming home, Ronnie left the house, ostensibly to go 
to school, but instead to stay with his father in Oklahoma. 
[la] The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. 
[2] "Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by 
proof (1) that the accused exercised dominion and control 
Over the contraband, (2) that he had knowledge of its pres-
ence, and (3) that the accused had knowledge that the 
material was a narcotic." (People v. Groom (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 
694, 696 [36 Cal.Rptr. 327, 388 P .2d 359].) [3] When con-
traband is found in a place to which a defendant and others 
have access and over which none has exclusive control "no 
sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of facts 
which will and that which will not constitute sufficient evi-
dence of a defendant's knowledge of the presence of a nar-
cotic .... " (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 282, 287 
[10 Cal.Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255].) 
. [lb] If the evidence showed only that two boxes contain-
lllg marijuana were found hidden in the closet and under a 
h('d in a bedroom defendant shared with his brothers and to 
) 
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which guests also had access, the applicable rule would be that 
, 'proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are 
found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful 
possession." (People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 282, 285.) 
There was more in this case, however; for defendant fled from. 
his home when his mother confronted him: with the marijuana, 
demanded ,an explanation, and threatened to call the police. 
[4] The jury was not required to accept defendant's expla-
nation that his flight was motivated only by'a wish to escape 
from his mother's emotional outburst. The jury could rea-
sonably infer that his flight reflected consciousness of guilt 
and that he therefore knowingly possessed the marijuana 
found in the bedroom and' closet. It follows that the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury on the significance of 
flight purs~nt to Penal Code section 1127c. 
In support of his motion for a new trial' defendant submit-
ted an affidavit of a juror alleging misconduct on the part -of 
, the bailiff.1 The trial court refused to consider the affidavit on 
the ground that: "They [the jury] can't impeach their own 
verdict. " 
, The. rule that jurors cannot impeach their verdicts, 
although almost universally assailed by the commentators as 
V'I hereby certify and declare that I was a juror on the above-entitled 
,case and that the following is my recollection of the activities of the 
bailiff in regard to this case. 
"The Judge stated from the Bench that we would go to dinner at 
6: 00 p.m., if we had not reached a verdict. At 6: 00 p.m. we were not 
.. -taken to dinner. 
"It was not until about 6 :30 when the bailiff came in, and at our -
request. At this time inquiry of him was made as to when we would get 
to dinner. At this point he replied words to the effect: 'If you go out to 
eat; you will be locked up overnight.' At some time during the delibera-
tions in the late afternoon, after 6: 30, the bailiff came in and said words 
to this effect: 'If you knew what was· going on out there, you would be 
shivering in your boots.' At one time when he entered, around 7: 00, he. 
!;Cemed quite angry and put out. He said words, 'This is it.' We replied, 
'Give us a few more minutes and we can come to a verdict.' He gave us 
about five or ten minutes and said if we had not reached a verdict that 
was it. I feel that ·we were definitely rushed by the bailiff. When the 
bailiff came in the last time, I feJt we just had to make up our minds 
and that was it when he came in. He had come in three times and each 
time he seemed and spoke in a more angry manner. It was my opinion 
that the entire jury was uncertain as to how to proceed. As a result of 
his actions, everyone said, 'Hurry up.' It is my opinion that I hurried 
my verdict and agreed to the compromise verdict in order to prevent the 
jury from being locked up overnight. 
"There were about four of us who felt from the beginning of delibera-
tions that he was not guilty. I was the last holdout on the jury. The 
verdict for the lesser included was my verdict and was the verdict of the 
entire jury. I heard no vulgarity. I would not desire to sit on another _ 
jury if it was handled in the same way that this jury was handled by 
the bailiff." 
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without foundation in logic or policy,2 has been a common 
law rule in this state since our first volume of reports. (See 
People v. Baker (1851) 1 Cal. 403.) The rule first sprang full 
blown and unprecedented3 from the opinion of Lord Mans-
field in Vaise v. D~laval (1785) 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944, 
and was based on an extension of the principle nerno t'ltrpi-
iudinern suam allegans audietur-no man shall be heard to 
allege his own turpitude.4 With several exceptions, the rule 
was adopted by the courts in American jurisdictions, includ-· 
ing California, even though the principle on which it was 
originally based was largely repudiated as applied to other 
areas of the law of evidence. (See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 
CMcNaughtonrev. 1961) § 2352, p. 696.) 
The erroneous view that the California rule is statutory 
(see People v. Gidney (1937) 10 Cal.2d 138, 146 [73 P.2d 
1186]) had its roots in Boyce v. California Stage Co. (1864) 
25 Cal. 460, 475. Before 1862, the rule was not refle~ted in any 
statute but was based on the court's view of public policy. 
(See People v. Baker (1851) 1 Cal. 403; Arnsby v. Dickhouse 
(1854) 4 Cal. 102; lVilson v. Berryrnan (1855) 5 Cal. 44 [63 
Am.Dec. 78 J .) In 1862, apparently in reaction to a scandal, 
the Legislature amended section,193 of the Practice Act (now 
§ 657 of Code Civ .. Proc.) to provide that verdicts obtained by 
"resort to the determination of chance" might be impeached 
by affidavits of the jurors. (Stats. 1862, ch. 48, § 1, p. 38; see 
People v. Ritchie (1895) 12 Utah180, 194 [42 P. 209J.) The 
court in Boyce found that in creating the exception to the 
general rule, the Legislature "upon the maxim, expressio 
tl1lius, excl1.lsio alien:u,s est, has declared that verdicts of a 
different class shall not be so impeached." (Boyce v. Califor- . 
fZia, Stage Co., supra, 25 Cal. 460, 475.) This reading of the 
statute was followed in People v. AzofJ (1895) 105 Cal. 632, 
634 [39 P. 59], and later cases. (E.g., People v. Reid (1924) 
2St'C Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law (1947) 
8~-HO; 8 'Vigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) §§ 2345-2354; 
!\ott' (1956) 56 Colum.L.Rev. 952; Note (1947) 47 Colum.L.Rev. 1373; 
L(':I\"itt, The Jury at Work, 13 Hastings L.J. (1962) 415,445-446; Note 
(]!I:i!l) 10 Hastings L.J. 319; Note (1956) 54 Mich.L.Rey. 1003; Note 
<,HI4~) 47 ).rich.L.Rev. 261; Note (1915) 64 U.Pa.L.R,ev. 86; Falknor, !'/-!'~1/.~;(, p'olicies Affecting Admissibility (1956) 10 Rutgers L.Rey. 574, 
.,.1 h)HS; N oto (1958) 25 U.Chi.L.Rev. 360 ; Note (1951) 37 Va.L.Rev. 
(S:H}I, t-;6~; Kote (1966) 41 \Vash.L.Rey. 346. See contra Note (1955) 43 
II .L.Hp\,. 729. 
l' ~~l'(' ('al'lier cases to the contrary cited and discussed in 8 \\Tjgmorc, 
.\'i( l'1l('C OreNaughton rev. 1961) § 23.52, pp. 696-697, fll. 2. 
"Tile> jurors in Vaise v. Delaval lind reached their verdict by lot, 
tOIl( ud that Lord Mansfield classed as a very hjgh misdemeanor. 
a48 PEOPLE v. HUTCHINSON [71 C.2d 
195 Cal. 249, 261 [232 P. 457, 36 A.L.R. 1435] ; People v. 
Gidney, supra, 10 Ca1.2d 138, 146.) 
[5] Although purporting to recognize legisla.tive preemp-
tion of the field, the court in Gidney also acknowledged the 
existence of the judicial exception to the rule that allows 
jurors' affidavits to be used to prove that one or more of the 
jurors concealed bias or prejudice on voir dire. (People v. 
Gidney, supra, 10 Ca1.2d 138, 146; see lVilliams v. Bridges 
(1934) 140 Cal.App. 537 [35 P.2d 407].) This exception is 
now well settled (see e.g., Kol.lert v. C'ltndiff (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 
768, 773-774 [329 P.2d 897] ; People v. Castaldia (1959) 51 
Ca1.2d 569, 572 [335 P.2d 104]) and has beene;xtended to 
allow the use of juror affidavits to show that a juror was 
mentally incompetent at the tilne of trial (Ch'ltrch v. Capital 
Freight Lines (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d246, 248 [296 P.2d 
563]) and to show that a juror did not intend to follow the 
court's instructions on the law and had concealed that inten-
--
tion on voir dire. (Noll v. Lee (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 81 [34 
Cal.Rptr. 223].) 
Thus the courts have not followed the view that the Legis· 
lature has enacted the common law rule, but on the contrary 
have made changes in the rule they deemed dictated by 
experience and justice. The Legislature has never sought to 
restrict the power of the courts to enla.rge the area in which 
jurors may impeach their verdicts. The rule owes its continu-
ing vitality, not to statute, but to the force of stare decisis , 
(see Sopp v. Smith (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 12, 15-16 [27Cal.Rptr. 
593, 377 P .2d 649] (dissen ting opinion, Peters, J.) ; People v. 
"-"-'--'-"-:Azoff, s'ltpra,105Cal. -632,634 )aIid toavariety'oflegal-' 
arguments and public policies that, like the discredited policy 
~gainst self-stultifying testimony, cannot withstand careful 
analysis. 
In Kollert v. Cundiff, supra, 50 Cal.2d 768, 773-774, we 
stated the rationale presently underlying the rule: "-The 
problem involves the' balancing of two conflicting policies. It 
is, of course, necessary, to prevent instability, of verdicts, 
fraud, and harassment of jurors, and, on the other hand, it is 
desirable to give the losing party relief from wrongful con-
duct by the jury. The court in lJlcDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 
264, 267-269 [59 IJ.Ed, 1300, 1302.1303, 35 S.Ct. 783], after 
discussing these policies and stating that the wrong to the 
indiyidual was the lesser of two evils, concluded that as a 
general rule the affidavits [of jurors] should be excluded but 
that there might be instances where the rule could not be 
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applied without' violating the plainest principles of justice. ' " 
(See also, Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. etc. Co. (1899) 125 Cal. 
501, 504-505· [58 P. 169]; People v. AzofJ, supra, 105 Cal. 
632, 635.) Upon further deliberation we have concluded that 
there is no substantial conflict of policies and that the wrong 
to the individual cannot be considered the lesser of two evils. 
In the Evidence Code the Legislature has determined that 
certain facts may be proved to impeach a verdict. "Upon an 
inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissi~ 
ble evidence may be received as to statements made, or con-
duct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without 
the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influ-
enced the verdict improperly. ]:'Io evidence is admissible to 
show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event 
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which 
it was determined." (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).) ·This 
distinction between proof of overt acts, objectively ascertaina-
ble, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of the 
individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor dis-
proved, has been advocated by commentators (se e.g., 8 Wig-
more, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) §§ 2349, 2352-2354; 
Note (1956) 56 Colum.L.Rev. 952; Note (1959) 10 Hastings 
L.J. 319; Note (1956) 54 Mich.L:Rev. 1003; Note (1948) 47 
~lich.L.Rev. 261), adopted by the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
(rules 41 and 44) and the Model Code of Evidence (rule 
301), and has been the basic limitation on proof set by the 
leading decisions allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts. 
(See Wright v. Illinois &; Miss. Tel. Co. (1866) 20 Iowa 195; 
Perry v. Bailey (1874) 12 Kan. 415, 418-419; State v. Kocio-
lek (1955) 20 N.J. 92, 99-103 [118 A.2d 812, 58 A:L.R.2d 
545]. See also, People v. Stokes (1894) 103 Cal. 193, 196-197 
[ 37 P. 207, 42 Am.St.Rep. 102] ; Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts 
and :Magistrates (1969) Rule 6-06 and Advisory Committee's 
Notes, pp. 117-119.) 
Although section 1150 does not alter the rule against 
~mpeaehment of a verdict by the jurors,5 its limitation of 
ulll)(>a.chment evidence to proof of overt conduct, conditions, 
e~·~nts, and sta.tements, as suggested by the commentators, 
'·ltiates the major policy arguments supporting the common 
fr~~l'('tion 1150, subdivision (b), reads as follows: "Nothing in this code 
!' ('ds the law relating to the competence of a juror to give evidence to 
llul1l'aeh or support a verdict." 
350 PEOPLE v. HUTCHINSON [71 C.2d 
law rule. (See Sopp v. Sinith, supra, 59 Cal.2d 121 15-20 (dis-
senting opinion, Peters, J.).) This .limitation prevents one 
juror from upsetting a verdict of the. whole jury by impugn-
ing his own or his fellow jurors' mental processes or reasons 
for assent or dissent. [6] The only imprope.r influences 
that may be proved under . section. 1150 to impeach a verdict, 
therefore, are those open to sight, hearing, and the other 
senses and thus subject to corroboration. (See.Note(1956) 54 
Mich.L.R.ev. 1003, 1005; Perry v. Bailey (1874) 12 Kan. 415, 
419. ) . " [T] hese facts can be easily proved or disproved. There 
is . invariably Jittle disagreement as to their occurrence." 
(Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evi-
·dence (1963) 80.) Experience W other jurisdictions that 
recognize the competency of a juror to impeach his verdict 
. indicates that the admission of jurors' affidavits within the 
limits set by section 1150 will not result in the. widespread 
upsetting of verdicts. (See Note (1958).25 U.ChLL.Rev. 360, 
372, fn. 78; Note (1951) 37 Va.L.Rev. 849, 862.) Experience 
in this state with the present exceptions "indicates that the 
fears of jury tampering are unrealistic" (6 Cal. Law Revi-
sion Com. Reports (1964) 611), and there is no reason to 
believe that permitting proof of other overt misConduct is 
more likely to encourage post verdict tampering wit}! the jury 
than do the present exceptions. ; 
Admission of jurors' affidavits within the . limits set by sec-
. tion 1150 protects the stability of verdicts, and allows proof 
by the best evidence of misconduct on the part of either jurors 
. or third ~rties that should be. exposed, misconduct upon 
which no verdict should· be based. (See· Peri. Code, § 1181 ;------~ 
Code. Civ. Proc., § 657.) The content and conduct or delibera-
tions may already be exposed by jurors at the trial of one who 
attempted corruptly to influence the verdict, or, in the case of 
the present two exceptions ·to the rule, at motion for new triaI:. 
Admission of· this best evidence of misconduct or improper 
influence at a ·motion for new trial, therefore, would not 
. present a breach in the post verdict privacy of jury' delibera-
tions. It would merely insure that evidence of misconduct will 
be available to the courts, freeing them to· determine the sub-
stantive questions of whether the particular misconduct is a 
recognized ground for new trial and whether it has preju-
diced the losing Mrty. Admissi9n of jurors' affidavits should 
also have a further prophylactic effect of stripping from all 
prejudicial misconduct whatever veil of. post verdict secrecy is 
now reserved for the proper deliberations of the jury. "[T]o -
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hear such proof would have a tendency to diminish such p-rac-
tices alld to purify the jury room, by rendering such impro-
prieties capable and probable of exposure, and consequently 
deterring jurors from resorting to them." (Wright v. Illinois 
etc. Tel. Co., supra, 20 Iowa 195,211.) 
[7] We therefore hold that jurors are competent witnesses 
to prove objective facts to impeach a verdict under section 
1150 of the Evidence Code. To the extent that Sopp v. Smith, 
supra, 59 Cal.2d 12, Kollert v.' Cundiff, supra, 50 Cal.2d 768, 
and similar cases are contrary to our conclusion herein, they 
are overruled . 
[8] The bailiff's remarks and the tone of· their delivery 
constitute statements and conduct that are "likely to have 
. influenced the verdict improperly." (Evid. Code, § 1150; see 
People v. Gidney, supra, 10 Cal.2d 138, 146.) The affidavit of' 
the juror is therefore admissible to prove the statements and 
conduct of the bailiff. Since the trial court refused to consider 
this competent evidence, defendant is entitled to a redetermi-
na.tion of his motion for new trial. 
The order granting probation and the order denying the 
motion for new trial are vacated with directions to the trial 
court to hear and determine the motion for new trial in 
accordance with this opinion and to take such further pro-
ceedings as are appropriate. 
l\fcComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., l\:1.osk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1969. 
